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A number of lawsuits in the United States are challenging the 
employment classification of workers in the platform economy. Employee 
status is a crucial gateway in determining entitlement to labor and 
employment law protections. In response to this uncertainty, some 
commentators have proposed an “intermediate”, “third,” or “hybrid” 
category, situated between the categories of “employee” and 
“independent contractor.”  
 
After investigating the status of platform workers in the United 
States, the authors provide snapshot summaries of five legal systems that 
have experimented with implementing a legal tool similar to an 
intermediate category to cover non-standard workers: Canada, Italy, 
Spain, Germany, and South Korea. These various legal systems have had 
diverse results. There has been success in some instances, and 
unintended consequences in others. 
 
Accordingly, we recommend proceeding with caution in considering 
the creation of a third category. That is due to the risk of arbitrage 
between the categories, and the possibility that some workers will lose 
rights by having their status downgraded into the third category. Cherry 
and Aloisi posit employee status as the default rule for most gig workers. 
The authors propose an exception for those working on a de minimis 
basis or those engaged in volunteerism for altruistic reasons. 
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2 
Introduction  
 
During the past five years there have been a number of lawsuits 
in the United States challenging the employment classification of 
workers in the gig economy.1  Classification of a worker as an 
employee is an important “gateway” to determine who receives the 
protections of the labor and employment laws, including the right 
to organize, minimum wage, and unemployment compensation, as 
well as other obligations such as tax treatment.  In response to both 
litigation and widespread confusion about how gig workers should 
be classified, some commentators have proposed a “third” or 
“hybrid” category, situated between the categories of “employee” 
and “independent contractor.”  Proponents often note that creating 
a third category would be a novel innovation, appropriately crafted 
and tailored for an era of digital platform work.2  
 
However, as we have noted in a previous article, such an 
intermediate category of worker is actually not new.  In this 
chapter we will provide snapshot summaries of five legal systems 
that have experimented with implementing a legal tool similar to a 
third category to cover non-standard workers:  Canada, Italy, 
Spain, Germany, and South Korea.   These various legal systems 
have had diverse results.  There has been success in some 
instances, and misadventure in others.  We believe that examining 
these experiences closely will help to avoid potential problems that 
are beginning to surface in discussions about the third category and 
the gig economy. 
 
This chapter largely will forgo the background on how 
platforms operate or the description of the tasks workers do, 
instead focusing on the classification problem3.  After examining 
the status of gig work in the United States and the calls for a third 
category, we turn to look at summaries of five legal systems and 
their experiences with the third category.  After examining how, in 
Italy, some employees actually lost rights because their status was 
downgraded into an intermediate “parasubordinate” category, we 
                                                
1 For a listing of the ongoing litigation surrounding the on-demand economy, see 
Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of 
Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584-85 (2016). 
2 See, e.g. Vin Guerrieri, Uber Cases Could Spur New Employee Classification, 
LAW360 BLOG, May 6, 2016. 
3 This topic is widely covered in the first section of this Handbook. See also 
Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized workers: Case study research on labor law 
issues arising from a set of on-demand/gig economy platforms, 37 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 577, 653-90 (2016). 
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must be careful to consider the unintended consequences of 
creating a third category.  Informed by these national case studies, 
we provide a review of what we might expect if a third category 
were to be created in the United States, along with noting some of 
the practical difficulties.  
 
Based on the proposals for a third category as well as the 
country studies, we ultimately set forward a different proposal for 
reform. Rather than creating another category and risking further 
mischief around the subject of worker misclassification, we 
advocate that the default rule for platform work should be 
employee status or something resembling it closely.  At the same 
time, we readily acknowledge that there are parts of the sharing 
economy that are not about labor relations or potential exploitation 
of workers; rather, they are about communities, innovation, and 
genuine sharing.  The goal of our proposal is protection for those 
who are using platforms as their main source of income as an 
equivalent to professional employment, while exempting those 
who are using these platforms to create community values or as a 
way to volunteer. 
 
The Classification Problem in the United States 
 
We will begin with the U.S., the jurisdiction that saw the 
invention of the gig economy and that has, until recently, also been 
the site of most classification disputes.  Under U.S. law, whether a 
worker is an employee or independent contractor is determined 
through various multifactored tests dependent on the facts of the 
relationship.4  The “control” test derives from the caselaw and 
decisions on agency law, and focuses on a principal’s right to 
control the worker.  In brief we will suffice to say that some of the 
factors for finding employee status are whether the employer may 
direct the way in which the work is performed, determine the hours 
involved, and provide the employee with direction.5  On the other 
hand, elements that lean toward independent contractor 
                                                
4 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: 
Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and and Employees without 
Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 257-58 (2006) (listing factors 
from the cases).  Oft-cited cases on this subject include Rutherford Food Corp. 
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S., 
398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
326 (1992).  
5 See, e.g. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, Inc., 161 F.3d 
299 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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classification include high-skilled work, workers providing their 
own equipment, workers setting their own schedules, and getting 
paid per project, not per hour.6  In an alternate test, courts examine 
the economic realities of the relationship to determine whether the 
worker is exhibiting entrepreneurial activity, or whether the worker 
is financially dependent upon the employer7.  The label affixed to 
the relationship is a factor in the outcome, but it is certainly not 
dispositive.  
 
Many commentators had hoped these disputes over worker 
classification would be concluded, or at least be shaped, by the 
wage and hour lawsuits within platform companies that have been 
pending in the Northern District of California.  But the largest of 
these suits, O’Connor v. Uber, 8 has been in the process of settling 
for over a year now.  Like other litigation, including the 
crowdwork minimum wage lawsuit Otey v. Crowdflower, the cases 
have been settling without providing any definite answers about 
whether platform workers are employees or independent 
contractors.9  
 
Calls for Creating a Third Category in the United States 
 
 As litigation over worker misclassification lawsuits 
continues in various U.S. jurisdictions, proponents have looked to 
the third category as a solution.  Intuitively appealing, a third 
category would resolve many of the ongoing lawsuits and disputes 
over misclassification plaguing the on-demand sector.  Many of the 
calls for a third category originated in Silicon Valley, with the third 
category virtually mirroring what is now independent contractor 
status.10  Some proponents of the third category claim that such a 
proposal would have advantages for gig workers as well, who 
                                                
6 See, e.g. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on A Theme of Employment: Labor 
Law Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 
(1996). 
7 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: 
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without 
Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. L. & LAB. L. 251, 257–58 (2006). 
8 O’Connor v. Uber, 3:13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal.). 
9 Cherry, supra note 1 at 584-85. 
10  “At a recent on-demand economy event, Simon Rothman, a venture 
capitalist and advisor to companies like Lyft and Taskrabbit, said, “I think it’s 
not 1099 versus W-2. I think the right answer is a third class of worker.”  
Caroline Donovan, What a New Class of Worker Could Mean for the Future of 
Labor, BUZZFEED NEWS, June 18, 2015, available at 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/meet-the-new-worker-same-as-
the-old-worker?utm_term=.uipR68pav#.qe99zxMmQ. 
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would at least attain some portion of the benefits that accrue to 
employees. 
 
In 2015 a report written by Alan Krueger and Seth Harris, 
sponsored by the Hamilton Project, a subsidiary of the Brookings 
Institute, advocated for the creation of a third category.11  Pursuant 
to this proposal, all gig economy workers would default into 
“independent worker” status.  Under the Hamilton project 
proposal, such “independent workers” would gain rights to 
organize and bargain collectively under the NLRA and would also 
gain anti-discrimination protections under Title VII.  However, the 
Hamilton project proposal excludes payment for overtime and 
minimum wage arrangements.  Another study has come out largely 
echoing the Hamilton Project proposal.12  Meanwhile, on the 
political front, Senator Mark Warren of Virginia has recently 
begun discussing the need for legislation to address some of the 
issues surrounding gig-work.13 
 
A Comparative Approach 
 
To date, the recent calls to establish a third category of 
“independent worker” have focused only on the present state of the 
gig economy.  Likewise, these calls have been centered almost 
wholly on the United States, where many popular crowdwork 
services were created.  Situating the “dependent contractor” 
category within an historical and global context, however, we note 
that other countries have already experimented with contractual 
forms that functionally resemble the intermediate category, with 
various and mixed results.  We provide “snapshots” of these legal 
interventions below. 
 
Canada 
 
                                                
11 Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws 
for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker,” THE HAMILTON 
PROJECT, available at 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twent
y_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf.  
12 Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 31 (2017). 
13 Mark Warner, Asking Tough Questions About the Gig Economy, MARK R. 
WARNER (June 19, 2015), 
http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsclips?ContentRecord_id=9
ec95aab-a96c-4dd5-8532-b45667013d2e. 
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Historically, Canadian law used the term “employee” as a 
gateway to coverage, using the binary employee / independent 
contractor distinction just as in the United States.  As most 
statutory definitions of “employee” in Canadian statutes were 
circular and unhelpful, the starting point for most analyses was the 
control test that had evolved under the principle of vicarious 
liability for torts.   
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the doctrine around 
employee status took an interesting turn with the Canadian 
adoption of the concept of “dependent contractor.” The 
development of the category is largely due to the efforts of leading 
law professor, Harry Arthurs.14  An article by Professor Arthurs’ 
noted that in the 1960s small tradespeople, artisans, plumbers, 
craftsmen, and the like were increasingly structuring themselves as 
separate business entities.15  Yet, despite setting up shop as 
separate companies, and thus falling outside the traditional 
purview of “employees,” these tradespeople had no other 
employees but the one worker-owner.  As a matter of economic 
reality, Arthurs noted that these putative independent businesses 
were often almost wholly economically dependent on larger 
businesses.  As such, Arthurs argued that the law did these small 
business people an injustice in ruling them outside of the bounds of 
the traditional labor relationship.16 
 
The influence of Arthurs’ article spread far beyond 
academic circles. As the court in Fownes Construction v. 
Teamsters noted, this was “one law review article which has had 
an impact on the real world.”17  Arthurs’ influence was such that 
the concept of “dependent contractor” became established within 
Canadian Law during the 1970s.18  The effect was significant and 
beneficial in terms of bringing more workers within the scope of 
                                                
14 Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Case Study of the Legal 
Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Fownes Construction Co. Ltd. and Teamsters, [1974] 1 CLRBR 452 (British 
Columbia Labour Relations Board). 
18 See Michael Bendel, The Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed 
Development in Canadian Labour Law, 22 U. TORONTO L.J. 374, 376 (1982) 
(“Although the notion of the dependent contractor did not surface in Canada 
until 1965, concern for his status had become part of the conventional wisdom 
on labour relations by the early 1970s.  Between 1972 and 1977 seven 
jurisdictions in Canada adopted legislation to grant dependent contractors 
employee status under their labor relations legislation.”). 
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collective bargaining. 
 
 Ultimately, in Canada the third category of “dependent 
contractor” has resulted in an expansion of the definition of 
employee.  The category was enacted to help those workers who 
were essentially working on their own in a position of economic 
dependency, thus requiring labor protections.  
 
The labor issues around platform work have yet to be heard 
by a Canadian court or adjudicative body.  As such, predictions are 
inherently uncertain.  But it does seem that the “dependent 
contractor” category and accordingly expansive definition of 
“employee” will make it more likely that gig economy workers 
will be able to access labor protections.   
 
Italy 
 
Italy’s worker classification originated in the ancient Roman 
Law notion of “locatio operarum” (right to control the worker) 
and “locatio operis” (contract for a specific result).19  This 
dichotomy was translated into the two categories of employee (in 
Italian, “subordinate worker”) and independent contractor in the 
Civil Code of 1942, with those binary categories still in force 
today. 
 
In addition to the “eterodirezione” or managerial power 
factor,20 the case law has developed a spectrum of subsidiary 
factors that could indicate the presence of an employment 
relationship.21  A judge may disregard the contractual label when 
                                                
19 The Roman distinction was between locatio conductio operarum, which refers 
to the classic master and servant contract and implies the right to control and 
encompasses respondeat superior, and locatio conductio conductio operis, which 
was based on the production of a specific result.  See generally WILLIAM 
BURDIK, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATIONS TO MODERN LAW 
(1938); Matthew Finkin, Introduction, COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1 (1999-
2000). 
20 Cass. 22 November 1999 no 12926, RIDL 200011633. Moreover, in order to 
prove a subordinate relationship, this power should imply specific and well-
defined directives rather than programmatic and vague instructions, since the 
latters are also compatible with the independent contractor’s category. Their 
compatibility with autonomous work are not sufficient for establishing an 
employment relationship  
21 Cass. sez. lav., 27/03/2000, n. 3674. “When an assessment of unambiguous 
elements such as the exercise of the managerial and disciplinary power is not 
enough to distinguish among employee and self-employed (being the presence 
Cherry & Aloisi | Draft 
 
8 
the substance of the work relationship reveals legal indicia of 
subordination (the so-called “primacy of facts” principle).22 These 
factors include: (i) the requirement that the worker follow 
reasonable work rules; (ii) the length of relationship; (iii) the 
respect of set working hours; (iv) salaried work; and (v) absence of 
risk of loss related to the production. None of these elements is 
dispositive.23  
 
Italian Law 533/1973 extended some procedural protection 
to a tranche of self-employed workers, which would later come to 
be known as “lavoratori parasubordinati” or “quasi-subordinate” 
workers.  Comprised of a sub-set of self-employed workers, these 
lavoratori parasubordinati were distinguished as those workers 
who were “collaborating with a principal/buyer under a 
continuous, coordinated and predominantly personal relationship, 
although not of subordinate character” (“co.co.co” by 
abbreviation).  Four “concurrent” factors needed to be ascertained 
in order to denote this intermediate category: (i) cooperation; (ii) 
continuity and length of the relationship; (iii) functional 
coordination with the principal; (iv) a predominantly personal 
service.  This measure artificially created an intermediate category. 
 
Looking at the content of the lavoratore parasubordinato 
category, only limited rights, mostly consisting of access to the 
labor courts, were extended to these workers.  As a subset of 
autonomous workers, quasi-subordinate workers were still outside 
the scope of the substantive labor law.24  As a consequence, it was 
much cheaper to hire a quasi-subordinate worker than an 
employee, because employees are entitled to substantive labor 
                                                                                                         
of the two powers a safe index of subordination, while its absence is not an 
indisputable sign of autonomy)...” 
22 Art. 1362 of the Italian Civil Code, provides that a contract must be 
interpreted with regard to the common intention and the behavior of the parties, 
and not merely to the literal meaning of its wording. 
23 Maurizio Del Conte, Lavoro autonomo e lavoro subordinato: la volontà e gli 
indici di denotazione, Orientamenti Della Giurisprudenza del Lavoro 66 (1995). 
24 STEFANO LIEBMAN, ILO NAT’L STUDIES, EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS AND 
WORKERS’ PROTECTION, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_dialogue/---dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205366.pdf; MARK 
FREEDLAND & NICOLA KOUNTOURIS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF PERSONAL 
WORK RELATIONS 122 n.61 (2011) (“The emergence of the notion of 
parasubordinati in the Italian legal domain is traditionally linked to Law 
533/1973, . . . which prescribed that the rules of procedure for labor litigation 
also apply to the ‘relationship of agency, of commercial representation and other 
relations of collaboration materialising in a continuous and coordinated 
provision, predominantly personal, even if not of subordinate character.’”). 
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rights, annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave, other employee 
benefits, overtime, and job security against unfair dismissal.  
 
Undesirable effects occurred quickly followed.  Businesses 
increasingly began to hire workers that would previously have 
been classified as employees under the lavoratore parasubordinato 
category, hiding bona fide employment relationships in order to 
reduce costs and evade worker protections.  Therefore, workers 
saw a “gradual erosion of the protections afforded to employees 
through jobs that are traditionally deemed to constitute master-
servant relationships in the strict sense[,] progressively entering the 
no man’s land of an inadequately defined notion.”25 Quasi-
subordinate workers were seen as a low-cost alternative to stable 
employment relationships, especially because “no social security 
contributions had to be paid in their regard by the principal, at that 
time.”26   
 
Revision truly began in 2003, when the legislature 
amended the content of the quasi-subordinate category with 
Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 (the so-called Biagi Reform).  
The legislature required the collaboration be linked to at least one 
“project” to ensure their authenticity and protect against businesses 
disguising employees as quasi-subordinate.  Thus, a new definition 
emerged for quasi-subordinate workers: “lavoro a progetto” (i.e. 
project work, also “co.co.pro”).  In 2012, the Italian legislature 
passed Law No. 92/2012 (Monti-Fornero Reform)27 to counteract 
the misuse of the intermediate category by making employee status 
the default.  Ultimately, the 2015 “Jobs Act” fundamentally 
eliminated the concept of project work that had its genesis in the 
2003 Biagi law.  The Jobs Act firmly established employee status 
is the default. While the quasi-subordinate category still 
technically exists, it is now limited in scope.28   
                                                
25 STEFANO LIEBMAN, ILO NAT’L STUDIES, EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS AND 
WORKERS’ PROTECTION, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_dialogue/--- dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205366.pdf. 
26 ULRIKE MUEHLBERGER, DEPENDENT SELF-EMPLOYMENT, WORKERS ON THE 
BORDER BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT (2007). 
27 Legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92 - Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato 
del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita.  
28 Article 2 of Legislative Decree No. 81/2015 (the “Jobs Act”) has designed a 
new notion of “collaborations organised by the principal”, whereby the client 
organises all performance related aspects, including above all time and site. 
Should this be the case, all employment statutory provisions afforded to 
subordinate workers apply to self-employed workers. See Antonio Aloisi, Il 
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For the past two decades, the quasi-subordinate category in 
Italy has resulted in arbitrage, struggle, and ultimately reversal. 
Introducing such a non-standard contract initially resulted in some 
employees seeing their classification status downgraded.  Along 
with this loophole came an increase in precarious and non-standard 
work.  
 
Spain 
 
The Spanish Workers’ Act was passed in 1980, roughly ten 
years after Italy had engaged in major legislative reform.  This law, 
Estatuto de los Trabajadores, covers only employees, defined as 
“those individuals who voluntarily perform their duties, in 
exchange for compensation, within the limits of the organisation 
and under the directions of a natural or juridical person, referred to 
as employer or entrepreneur.”29  Spanish independent contractors 
were left to constitutional, civil and commercial provisions of the 
law.30  
 
The traditional binary classification between employees and 
independent contractors in Spain depended upon a determination 
of self-organization, as an exercise of contractual autonomy.  
Spanish case law has interpreted the definition of an employee to 
be a combination of two concurrent elements: (i) the exercise of 
managerial power (“dirección”), and (ii) how much autonomy the 
workers have.31  Spanish legal scholars have focused on the 
element of “alienness” (“ajenidad”, also defined as “ownership by 
another”) as a factor in determining whether an individual is an 
employee. “Alienness” is a proxy for the allocation of risk, and 
consequently, the ownership of “the means of production and the 
financial benefits obtained by the company from the employee’s 
                                                                                                         
lavoro “a chiamata” e le piattaforme online della “Collaborative Economy”: 
nozioni e tipi legali in cerca di tutele/On-Demand Work and Online Platforms in 
the Collaborative Economy, 2 LLI 2421 (2016). 
29 Article 1.1 Ley, 8/1980, de 10 de marzo 1980. “Those persons who carry out a 
trade or profession for economic gain on a regular, personal and direct basis on 
their own account, in the absence of any supervision or direction from a third 
party, whether or not they employ other workers on another’s account.”  Ley, 
8/1980, de 10 de marzo. 
30 A relatively recent one, Constitucion Espanola 27 diciembre 1978. 
31 Perulli, supra note 84; J. Lujan Alcaraz, Introducion, El Estatuto del Trabajo 
Autónomo. Análisis de la Ley 20/2007, de 11 de julio, Laborum, 2007, 20. 
Royal legislative decree No. 1/1995 of 24 March, through which is approved the 
recast text of the law on the Statute of Workers, Official Gazette, No. 75, dated 
29 March 1995, pp. 9654–9688. 
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work.”32  As with other jurisdictions, the contractual label set by 
the parties is not dispositive. Rather, a judicial assessment of the 
substance of the relationship (e.g., day-by-day arrangements) is 
most important.33 
 
In 2007, the Spanish legislature34 enacted a new law (Law 
20/2007, July 11, Estatuto del trabajo autónomo, LETA, i.e. 
Statute for Self-Employed Workers).35 LETA regulated all forms 
of self-employed or independent contractor-type of work and 
covered all aspects of self-employment.  LETA crafted a third 
category of workers: “Trabajador Autonomo Economicamente 
Dependiente” (or TRADE, i.e. economic dependent self-employed 
worker).  The TRADE were extended a fairly comprehensive 
package of benefits and protections that are almost as good as 
those given to employees.  
 
However, it is difficult to become a TRADE worker.  The 
crucial component for determining whether a worker is a TRADE 
rests on a 75% threshold of economic dependency.  The TRADE 
worker must “register” the position with the social administration 
agency, notify them of any changes, with the principal then 
verifying the information.  These strict requirements are 
burdensome and time-consuming for both workers and 
businesses.36 
 
Perhaps because of the extensive disclosure and heavy 
burden of compliance, few workers have actually become 
classified as TRADE.37  Meanwhile, Spanish labor unions 
                                                
32 See Miguel Ramón Alarcón Caracuel, Dipendenza e alienità nella discussione 
spagnola sul contratto di lavoro, in Lavoro Subordinato E Dintorni. 
Comparazioni E Prospettive 296 (1989); Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 
Trabajadores autónomos, 146 estudio de derecho judicial 100 (2008); Perulli, 
supra note 84. 
33 STS 29 dic. 1999 (RJ 1427/2000). 
34 See AA. VV. UN ESTATUTO PARA LA PROMOCIÓN Y TUTELA DEL 
TRABAJADOR AUTÓNOMO, Informe de la Comisión de Expertos, designada por 
el Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, para la elaboración de un Estatuto 
del Trabajador Autónomo. 
35 Law No. 20/2007, Official Gazette, No. 166, 12 July 2007, pp. 29964–29978. 
36 Mark Freedland, Application of labour and employment law beyond the 
contract of employment, 146 INT’L. LAB. REV. 3 (2007). 
37 In 2012, only 9,000 TRADE contracts were signed, compared to the 400,000 
forecasted. According to recent surveys by the Spanish organization “Unión de 
Asociaciones de Trabajadores Autónomos y Emprendedores,” only 2.4% of the 
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complained that the TRADE category was inappropriately 
covering what should be traditional employment relationships. 
With so few workers actually using this category, its usefulness is 
limited. 
 
Germany 
 
 Germany recognizes the categories of employees 
(arbeitnehmer) and independent workers.  Although until recently 
there was no statutory definition of “employee,” the Federal Labor 
Court has traditionally focused on the concepts of personal 
dependence  and the requirement that the worker must follow 
instructions as to time, site, and content of services.38  The name 
given in the contract is of little importance; rather, it is the 
substance of the relationship that is important.   
 
A German Federal Labour Court decision about circus 
performers is instructive.  In that case, the Court focused on the 
lack of control that the owners had over the performances, finding 
these workers to be more like independent workers.39  Independent 
workers are defined in opposition to employees, with Section 
84(1)(2) of the Commercial Code noting that independent workers 
are “anybody who essentially is free in organizing his work and in 
determining his working time.”40 
 
 German law also recognizes a third category of employee-
like person (arbeitnehmeraehnliche Person). As noted by a leading 
commentator, employee-like persons share two common 
characteristics: “they are economically dependent and are in 
similar need of social protection.”41 German labor courts had 
recognized employee-like persons, and in 1974 the category was 
codified in Section 12a of the German Collective Bargaining Act 
(Tarifvertraggesetz).  According to Section 12a, an employee-like 
person must perform his or her duty to (i) the benefit of a client; 
(ii) under service contract for a specific project; (iii) personally and 
largely without collaboration of subordinate employees.  
                                                                                                         
workforce have one principal and consequently “were covered by the fairly 
extensive protections [for TRADE] afforded by the Law of 2007.” 
38 See Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 77, 79 (1999-2000). 
39 Zirkus P GmbH & Co. KG v. Truppe C., Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] 
[Federal Labor Court], Aug. 11, 2015, 9 AZR 98/14. 
40 MANFRED WEISS & M. SCHMIDT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
IN GERMANY 45 (2008). 
41 Daubler, supra note 39 at 88-90. 
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Importantly, the provision also states that the employee-like person 
works mainly for one client and relies on a single client for 50% of 
his or her income, a threshold that has much in common with the 
Spanish TRADE.42   
 
While the definition of employee-like persons has some 
variation among statutes, the main characteristic seems to be 
economic dependence.    Employee-like persons enjoy some of the 
protections afforded to employees, including the right to unionize 
and bargain collectively, parental leave, paid holidays, and safety 
from harassment at work. 
 
 The aim of the third category of employee-like persons was 
to enlarge the scope of social protections, given the organizational 
and economic transformations around traditional employment 
relationships.  Will workers in the gig economy be protected as 
employee-like persons on the basis of this third category?  A recent 
article by Professor Bernd Waas points out that the requirement of 
working for one client for fifty percent of income could prove a 
significant hurdle for establishing employee-like person status for 
gig workers.43  But Professor Waas also invokes the possibility of 
joint employer doctrine as a way to connect different companies 
who hire the same worker to perform work on the same platform.  
 
South Korea 
 
In South Korea, the employee category is defined by 
statute.  Article 2(1) of the Korea Labor Standards Act uses the 
following definition: “a person, regardless of the kind of 
occupation, who offers labor to a business or workplace for the 
purpose of earning wages.”44  Other sources that elaborate upon 
this provision reveal that the concept of subordination is also 
important to making a classification determination.  A 2006 
Korean Supreme Court decision interpreting the Korea Labor 
Standards Act lists a series of factors to determine employee status.  
These factors include whether the employer controls the content of 
                                                
42 Stefanie Sorge, German Law on Dependent Self-Employed Workers: A 
Comparison to the Current Situation Under Spanish Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 249, 250 (2010). 
43 Bernd Waas, Crowdwork in Germany, in BERND WAAS ET ALII, CROWDWORK 
– A  
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE, FRANKFURT 2017, PP. 142 – 186. 
44  Korea Labor Standards Act, Art. 2, Sec. 1, available at http://elaw.klri.re.kr 
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the work; whether the employee is subject to personnel 
regulations; whether the employer supervises the work; whether 
the employee is free to hire a subordinate to perform the work; 
who provides work tools; how wages and income tax are 
structured; and the economic situations of the parties, 
respectively.45  Independent contractor status can conversely be 
inferred for those who do not meet the statutory definition of 
employees. 
 
Interestingly for our purposes, South Korea has had a 
longstanding percentage of the workforce that finds work in the 
informal, precarious, and casual sector.  Approximately one-third 
of the workforce finds work in the category of irregular 
employment (bijeonggyujik).46  According to older accounts, this 
large percentage of irregular workers is a result of rural to urban 
migration and consequent mismatches in the labor force with the 
jobs on offer as well as worker displacement.47  A more recent 
account points to the 1997 economic crisis and the IMF bailout, in 
which some traditional labor protections were compromised in the 
name of a flexible and competitive economy.48  As a result, more 
workers found themselves working in irregular employment. 
 
 Within the bijeonggyujik, South Korean law recognizes a 
category of workers known as “special type workers.”  As noted by 
Professor Deok Soon Hwang, special type workers are not a 
universal category but instead a statutorily-created occupational 
class for purposes of extending worker’s compensation coverage.49  
Specifically, Article 125 of the Korean Industrial Accident 
Compensation Act extends the protections of the worker’s 
compensation laws to groups of workers in “special types of 
employment,” so long as they provide labor service on a routine 
                                                
45 Decision 2004-DA-29736, Korea Supreme Court (2006).  Variations of this 
language also appear in Jong-Hee Park, Employment Situations and Workers 
Protections, Korea Labor Institute, Unpublished paper prepared for the ILO, 
November 1999 , available at <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_dialogue/---dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wcms_205370.pdf>.  
46 For discussion of the irregular sector, see Jennifer Jihye Chun, The Struggles 
of Irregularly-Employed Workers in South Korea, 1992-2012 (unpublished 
working paper for EOIW, 2014). 
47 Ji-Whan Yun, Unbalanced Development: The Origin of Korea’s Self-
Employment Problem from a Comparative Perspective, 47 J. OF DEVELOPMENT 
STUD. 786 (2011). 
48 See Chun, supra note 47. 
49 Deok Soon Hwang, Platform Work in South Korea, Korea Labor Institute.  
Translation in possession of authors.  This article was published in Korean by 
the Korean Labor Law Institute. 
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basis exclusively to a company and do not use subordinates.  This 
seems to be a way of distinguishing those workers who are 
dependent and in need of protection from true entrepreneurial 
enterprises.   
 
The special types of employment are enumerated in the 
statute and are quite specific: “insurance salesperson, visiting 
teachers, ready mix truck driver, gold course caddies… door to 
door deliverers, quick service driver… loan solicitor, credit card 
solicitor, and exclusive chauffeur service worker[.]”50  This last 
category of chauffeur was only added in July 2016.  It is difficult 
to justify precisely why these occupational categories, and not 
others, are covered; the answer lies in the politics behind union 
coverage in the wake of the Asian economic downturn in the late 
1990s.   
 
 In 2016, the Korea Labor Institute, in connection with the 
International Labour Office (ILO), organized a conference on 
crowdwork and the gig economy.  Special sessions were held to 
discuss the status of gig workers in South Korea.  While language 
barriers and translation issues have stymied market growth by gig 
economy companies within South Korea, the sector is continuing 
to grow.  
 
 While some gig workers, such as those working as drivers 
might be covered as special-type workers, participants noted that 
other types of gig workers, such as those working to perform odd 
jobs or those that work only in cyberspace would likely not be 
covered.  Furthermore, even for the enumerated categories of 
special-type workers, the extent of coverage and protection is an 
open question.  As noted above, it is far from certain if special-type 
workers enjoy the right to organize and the other protections 
extended to employees.  Commentators at the ILO conference 
expressed concern and frustration about the precarious nature of 
gig work and the perceived gaps in coverage for gig workers. 
 
Summary and Assessment of Outcomes 
 
The implementation of third categories in various nations 
highlights both successes as well as problems.  Canada’s passage 
of legislation in the 1970s created a new category of “dependent 
                                                
50 Id. 
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contractors” through amending the definition of “employee” in 
various statutes.  The practical result of the “dependent contractor” 
category was to expand the definition of employee and to bring 
more workers under the ambit of labor law protection.  The end 
result was increased coverage and the provision of a safe harbor 
for workers in need of protections, based on economic 
dependency.  The third category seems to have worked well in 
terms of expanding the coverage of the laws to an increasing 
number of workers. 
 
From Italy’s experimentation with the third category, we 
saw businesses trying to take advantage of a discounted status of 
the parasubordinato to evade regulations applicable to employees, 
such as social security contributions.  The quasi-subordinate 
category created a loophole that actually resulted in less protection 
for workers.  Through the years, the legislature attempted to adjust 
the category in order to provide appropriate coverage for workers. 
The ultimate result was confusion and since 2015, the intermediate 
category has been extremely limited.  Rather, workers are now 
presumed by default to be employees. 
 
Spain provided an example of a legal system that adopted a 
third category, but only for a very few workers.  The law assumes 
that TRADE workers are predominantly working for one business; 
this could be a problem for platform workers who are working for 
multiple platforms.   Looking at the causes of this very limited use 
of the category, it comes down to a heavy burden of requirements 
to be met, including the use of a strict economic threshold.   
 
While Germany’s category of employee-like persons is far 
less stringent and burdensome, the category still requires a 50 
percent dependency threshold.  This threshold may prove 
problematic for German crowdworkers unless they can mesh 
several employers together through the joint employer doctrines 
(i.e. accounts across different platforms would be pooled). 
 
Finally, South Korea has a category for special-type 
workers, but it is extremely narrow in scope, covering only certain 
types of occupational categories.  The exclusivity requirement in 
the law may create trouble for gig workers who work for more than 
one platform. Further, the benefits extended to those who fall into 
the special-type workers category are meager.  If the third type of 
category is too narrow, or the benefits provided too meager, the 
category may prove inadequate for the challenges of the on-
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demand economy.   
 
Analysis 
 
Note that the debate over misclassification actually can be 
interpreted two different ways.  One way to view the issue is to 
acknowledge that there has been legitimate confusion about forms 
of gig work that do not fit easily into binary distinctions. After all, 
gig-workers have some characteristics that are common to 
independent contractors and yet others that are reminiscent of 
employees.  The problem, under this view, lies with a legal test 
that is malleable, fact-intensive, and difficult to apply.  The other 
way to consider the misclassification issue is to acknowledge that 
there has long been arbitrage of the law – illegitimate practices that 
lead to misclassification of what truly are employment 
relationships.  These practices serve to hide employment 
relationships under the guise of “false” or “bogus” contractor 
situations.  Note that both of these problems may exist within the 
same legal system. 
   
At least in theory, establishing an intermediate category for 
gig work might alleviate legitimate confusion about how to apply 
to the test to gig workers.  However, if the consequences of 
establishing such a third category would be arbitrage and 
downgrading of employees to intermediate status, that would do 
nothing to eliminate bogus contractor status. In fact, adding a new 
category could increase the possibility for arbitrage.  We must 
acknowledge that three categories create more room for mischief 
than two, and we can see from the Italian case that such arbitrage 
there became widespread in response to the adoption of the quasi-
subordinate worker category. 
 
Difficulties with Implementing a Third Category in the United 
States 
 
If we examine the list of benefits and protections that go 
along with employee status, it becomes difficult to start excluding 
these from the third category.  What protections are completely 
unnecessary?  One of the primary complaints of many gig workers 
in inadequate pay for their time, so Harris & Kreuger’s suggestion 
that wage and hour laws could be excluded seems problematic.  
Apart from difficulties defining the category or how it would be 
constituted, there are also practical difficulties.  In the United 
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States, establishing a third category over a patchwork of state and 
federal regulation would be complex.   
 
While it is possible that judges and administrative bodies 
could shift their interpretation of the statutes so as to create a third 
category, it is unlikely given the way that the statutes are written.  
Given the current political climate it seems doubtful that a third 
category would be high on the legislative agenda in the United 
States right now.  Looking beyond Congress, adding a third 
classification when the statutes only call for two categories would 
call for a vast feat of administrative or judicial activism.  At least at 
this moment, reform in this direction seems unlikely from a 
practical perspective.  
 
Shifting Towards a Default Presumption of Employee Status 
 
Rather than create a new category, one way to govern the 
difficult classification issues is to change the default rules. Instead 
of having the platform choose to classify workers as independent 
contractors in its terms of service online and then later defend its 
position in lengthy, expensive, and time-consuming litigation, what 
if we began with a presumption that, above a certain threshold of 
hours, workers are employees?  Then those who truly are 
independent businesses or self-employed would opt-out of 
regulations based on a set of easily understood standards.   
 
But what about the idea that the gig economy is innovative?  
Should platforms be given special treatment because they use new 
technology?  Innovation has not typically been a basis for an 
exemption from the labor laws.  The problem is distinguishing 
between authentic innovators, who could compete on a level 
playing field or who have a distinct and interesting new technology 
or business model, and those platforms that are profiteers who 
exist only to take advantage of cheap labor by undercutting the 
law.  Hence our argument is that platforms should be normalized 
and treated like other employers, rather than fight over their 
supposed exceptionalism. 
 
Business models that either are truly “sharing,” some mix of 
profit and non-profit (for example, “B” corporations),51 or those 
that engage in prosumer transactions, genuinely might need room 
to experiment.  There should be a “safe harbor” created if the work 
                                                
51 Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Greenwashing¸ 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 281, 294 (2014). 
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looks more like volunteerism, sharing, or the work is being 
undertaken for altruistic reasons or community-minded 
motivations.  More recently, the European Commission has 
supported this view in its Communication on the “collaborative 
economy,” distinguishing between professional providers and 
private individuals.52 
 
There are also some instances where the provision of a 
service is de minimis (or provided so infrequently) that it does not 
merit employee status.  For example, if someone logs into a 
crowdwork platform and does some proofreading for an hour a 
month, that user is probably not an employee.  Likewise, those 
who participate in Lyft as a carpool on their way to work three 
days a week are probably not employees.  We do not wish to 
impose burdensome legalities on users for one-off situations.  
Likewise, we would not want to discourage neighbors or 
volunteers from providing their services to others when those 
efforts are truly voluntary or used only to defray legitimate 
expenses, such as those who carpool from city to city in Europe 
through BlaBlaCar.  Rather, we are more concerned with platforms 
that seem to be competing with, or in some instances replacing, 
full-time employment with on-demand precarious work.53 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Calls for a third category in the United States reflexively 
                                                
52 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy. On 
Wednesday 20 December 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) ruled that UberPop is not an information society service, but rather a 
transport service. In particular, the Court took the view that the service provided 
by the platform is more than a matching activity connecting, by means of a 
digital app, a nonprofessional driver with a private individual. Indeed, the 
provider of that intermediation service simultaneously organizes and offers 
urban transport services. In C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber 
Systems Spain (2014) ECLI:EU:C:2017:981 the Court observed that “Uber 
determines at least the maximum fare by means of the eponymous application, 
that the company receives that amount from the client before paying part of it to 
the non-professional driver of the vehicle, and that it exercises a certain control 
over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct, which can, in 
some circumstances, result in their exclusion”. 
53 Janine Berg, Uber, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings 
and Policy Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 
J. 543 (2016), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2740940. 
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appear to be an easy solution, tailor-made for the problems 
surfacing in the gig economy.  That initial reaction, however, is 
tempered upon further study of the content and history of the 
implementation of the third category in other nations.  In this book 
chapter we examined the experiences of other nations in the hopes 
of learning winning strategies and avoiding problems. 
   
In Italy, the adoption of the third category led to 
widespread arbitrage of the categories, with businesses moving 
employees into a “bogus” discounted status in the quasi-
subordinate category.  In Spain, the requirements for attaining the 
third category were burdensome enough that the third category 
only is applicable to a tiny number of workers. Viewed in this 
light, experimenting with a third category might be seen as more 
risky than just the “easy” or “obvious” solution as it first appears.  
  
Rather than risking arbitrage of the categories, and the 
possibility that some workers will actually end up losing rights, it 
makes sense to think about employment status as the default rule 
for most gig workers, except those that may fit into a safe harbor 
because they are either not working very much (true “amateurs”) 
or are engaged in volunteerism for altruistic reasons (truly 
“sharing”).  If there is to be an intermediate category, establishing 
one that, like Canada’s “dependent contractor,” expands the scope 
of the employment relationship would best meet the needs of gig 
workers.  Such a default rule or expanded definition makes sense 
whether we are thinking about gig workers, those in fissured 
workplaces, franchises, or other non-standard or contingent work 
arrangements.   
  
